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George Friedman:
The 30-Year War in Afghanistan
(STRATFOR, 29.juni 2010, utdrag)

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR

The Afghan War is the longest war in U.S. history. It began in 1980 and continues to rage. It began under Democrats but has been fought under both Republican and Democratic administrations, making it truly a bipartisan war. The conflict is an odd obsession of U.S. foreign policy, one that never goes away and never seems to end. As the resignation of Gen. Stanley McChrystal reminds us, the Afghan War is now in its fourth phase.

The first phase of the Afghan War began with the Soviet invasion in December 1979, when the United States, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, organized and sustained Afghan resistance to the Soviets.
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The second phase lasted from 1989 until 2001. The forces the United States and its allies had trained and armed now fought each other in complex coalitions for control of Afghanistan.
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The third phase began onSept. 11, 2001, when al Qaeda launched attacks on the mainland United States.
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The fourth phase of the war began in 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama decided to pursue a more aggressive strategy in Afghanistan. Though the Bush administration had toyed with this idea, it was Obama who implemented it fully.
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Though Obama’s goals were not altogether clear, they might be stated as follows

1. Deny al Qaeda a base in Afghanistan.


2. Create an exit strategy from Afghanistan similar to the one in Iraq by creating the conditions for negotiating with the Taliban; make denying al Qaeda a base a condition for the resulting ruling coalition.


3. Begin withdrawal by 2011.
   

To do this, there would be three steps:

1. Increase the number and aggressiveness of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.


2. Create Afghan security forces under the current government to take over from the Americans.


3. Increase pressure on the Taliban by driving a wedge between them and the population and creating intra-insurgent rifts via effective counterinsurgency tactics.

In analyzing this strategy, there is an obvious issue: While al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan in 2001, Afghanistan is no longer its primary base of operations. The group has shifted to Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and other countries. As al Qaeda is thus not dependent on any one country for its operational base, denying it bases in Afghanistan does not address the reality of its dispersion. Securing Afghanistan, in other words, is no longer the solution to al Qaeda.
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Friedman argumenterer også for at USAs egentlige strategi er å gå i allianse med lokale krigsherrer (i stedet for primært å styrke Karzai), altså delegere eller outsource sikkerhetsarbeidet. Jeg kjenner ikke de lokale forholdene i Afghanistan, men jeg er ganske usikker på hvor skarpe skillene er mellom diverse krigsherrer og selve Taliban - Afghanistan er jo et land uten klart senter og med stadig skiftende allianser.

Det er krig. Soldater blir drept i tjeneste. Hvem som er usle kryp og hvem som er terrorister skal være usagt.